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Large Enterprise Information Systems (EIS) projects fail at an alarming rate – especially 
within the government.  Hence, EIS project managers do not typically manage risk 
effectively.  Meanwhile per Moore’s Law, available computational power increases 
exponentially, or equivalently, cost-per unit of computational power decreases 
exponentially.  Exponentially expanding computational power fuels exponentially better 
device performance, which provides exponentially improved customer experiences. 
Moore’s Law is the most recent formulation of the long-observed exponentially 
decreasing cost per unit of technological functionality. This exponential law is a self-
sustaining artifact of competitive pressure.   To compete successfully, vendors must 
continually evolve their offerings per customer expectations.  Successful risk 
management strategies peg all activities to the overarching requirement to a) sustain or 
harvest the baseline exponential performance-per-cost growth rate, and b) differentiate 
their specific offerings on the basis of customer perceptions of delivered value-per-cost. 
Value Assurance Framework (VAF) translates best practices for risk management from 
traditional exponentially evolving manufacturing sectors, to the much more abstract 
requirements and less well-established discipline of EIS engineering and acquisition. 
VAF also applies successful practices for predicting risk in the volatile financial sector to 
capture additional departures from traditional systems engineering approaches necessary 
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Gigantic, highly successful, Internet-based information-centric enterprises such as 
Amazon.com, Travelocity, or the eFile tax return ecosystem, seem ubiquitous.  However, 
these impressive success cases notwithstanding, projects that aim to develop large 
complex, software-intensive distributed information systems often fail to meet their 
objectives, overrun their budgets, and are delivered late if at all  
(Bloch M, 2012) (GAO, 2014). The situation is particularly bad within military and other 
government programs (Defense Science Board, 2009).   
 
Many industrial think tanks and government watch dog organizations have highlighted 
this issue.  They have delivered myriad reports that provide damning statistics.  These 
reports point out both the general failure patterns to avoid, and the rare successful 
patterns to emulate.  However, these studies usually fall short of providing pragmatic, 
detailed, how-to, execution guidelines (GAO, 2014).  
 
Research being conducted by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) on behalf of the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) hypothesizes that creation of Enterprise 
Information System (EIS) Value Assurance Framework (VAF) (Gunderson, 2014) can 
close that gap.  In this sense, VAF is generally consistent with ideas presented in “Eating 
the IT Elephant.”  That is, that book’s authors present a technical and business construct 
for collecting and applying demonstrated best practices for delivering large IT systems 
aimed at improvement in the global success rate of large IT projects. (Hokins & Jenkins, 
2008)  VAF is also consistent with ongoing work at the Carnegie Mellon University 
Software Engineering Institute (SEI). This SEI work likewise recognizes a high failure 
rate in large software intensive projects, and aims to harmonize software architecting best 
practices with Department of Defense acquisition strategies (Brownsword, Albert, 
Carney, Place, Hammons, & Hudak, 2013).  
 
VAF asserts that software engineering is much less mature than traditional engineering 
disciplines (Brooks F. , 1995) so that traditional engineering assurance methods are not 
necessarily effective on large software-intensive projects.  VAF hypothesizes that the 
volatility associated with rapidly evolving Information Technology makes risks 
associated with EIS similar to those associated with volatile financial markets.  
Therefore, a critical component of VAF is a value-based risk management rubric that 
applies lessons learned from both traditional systems engineering and financial 
management.   
 
A common definition of “risk” is:  “The possibility that something bad will happen.” It 
follows that the rationale for accepting risk is the possibility that something good will 
happen as a result of the risky behavior.  In this sense, risk and associated reward are 
contextually coupled.  That is, acceptability of risk depends on how likely and how bad 
the potential bad consequences might be, compared to how likely and how good the good 
consequences might be. For a person who likes golf, it might be worth teeing off on a 
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cloudy day despite a 30% risk that the game might get rained out.  Even for a person who 
loves golf, it might not be worth teeing off near an ominous thunderhead even if there is 
just a .1% chance of getting struck by lightening.  Risk acceptance, then, becomes a 
value-based decision.  The golfer must weigh the relative value of he fun of playing golf, 
the comfort of staying dry, and the need to continue breathing against the likelihood of 
each of those valued outcomes occurring or not occurring.  
 
By definition, managing risk is equivalent to increasing the probability of success, i.e. 
achieving the desired reward.  There are at least two, often complimentary, approaches to 
managing risk.  Controlling risk means taking positive upstream actions that actually 
reduce downstream risks to acceptable levels.  For example removing bullets from the 
chamber of a gun reduces the risk that it will fire accidentally.  Hedging against risk 
means taking actions that leverage one risk against another.  For example, making a side 
bet on rolling 7 in a game of craps hedges against the risk of crapping out before rolling 
the point. Paying more up front for a more expensive product, because of its 
demonstrated higher reliability, controls the risk by reducing the odds that a particular 
component will ever fail.  Paying extra for a product warrantee hedges against the risk 
that the component will fail, by “making a bet” that the part will indeed fail.   
 
The perceived value of an investment portfolio is either its current or anticipated future 
worth measured in monetary units. To investors, reward is defined as positive Return on 
Investment (RoI), i.e. a measurable increase in monetary worth. Financial risk is 
manageable.  Investors weigh the value proposition of potentially large RoI vs. higher 
probability of getting any positive RoI. Investors who choose conservative strategies have 
high probability of earning at least some positive RoI, especially over the long term.  
Investors who choose aggressive strategies have higher probability of greater positive 
RoI, but also greater risk that their return will be negative.  Both conservative and 
aggressive investment portfolios include a blend of investments that hedge against risks 
in a way that increases probability of success. Success in this case is either assurance of 
at least some RoI, or increased likelihood of large RoI.  Understanding the factors that 
contribute to success and failure, and their associated probabilities is crucial.  It is also 
crucial to understand the likely degree of success or failure.  In other words, wise 
investors need to understand both the likelihood of the risk/reward factor occurring, and 
the likely financial magnitude of the consequence (positive or negative) of that 
occurrence.   
 
In this sense, risk is the probability that the investment will lose measurable value.  The 
amount of potential reward is highly correlated to the amount of associated risk. That is, 
riskier investments, like start up companies, have the potential to net very large RoI.  
Safer investments, like government bonds, don’t have that potential.  In the financial 
market, risk is essentially equivalent to uncertainty. Ergo, financial success depends on 
successfully managing uncertainty.  
 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the financial industry has evolved sophisticated methods for 
modeling uncertainty. Successful investors use these models, for the most part, to hedge 
against risk rather than to control it. On average, the value of managed financial 
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portfolios is equal to the state of the market – some do a little better, some a little worse.  
However, a very small number of the most successful investment portfolio management 
firms consistently perform well above the average. These very successful firms manage 
risk by literally equating the value of an investment to the probabilistic balance between 
its associated risk and reward. For example, some sophisticated investors apply tools such 
as Shannon’s Theorem and Bayesian techniques to determine the actual risk associated 
with a particular investment compared to what the “market” believes the risk is.  
Mismatches either way are equivalent to knowledge of whether investments are over or 
under valued.  That knowledge in turn provides sure bets for buyers or sellers who have 
the more precise understanding. (Weatherall, 2014) 
 
RoI is clearly the most important MOE for an EIS that supports the financial management 
ecosystem. VAF aims to apply these effective, ROI-focused, practices more broadly to 
EIS associated with other domains, especially defense-related domains.   
 
VAF EIS RISK-REWARD ASSUMPTIONS AND BOUNDARY CONDITIONS  
 
Assumptions and boundary conditions are descriptions of facts of life that constrain both 
risk and reward.  Governance policies are almost always boundary conditions for EIS 
projects; i.e., projects must comply with, or waive, policy.  Given the rapid evolution of 
IT, the perishability of the value of any particular Information Technology component or 
platform is almost always a critical BC for EIS projects. The specific security regimes 
involved are almost always critical boundary conditions for EIS projects. Etc.  Here are 
some typical boundary conditions for government EIS acquisitions: 
 
• Congressional mandates (e.g. title code, Goldwater/Nichols, Clinger Cohen Act, 
National Defense Authorization Acts, Sarbanes/Oxley) 
• Defense acquisition policy (e.g. Federal Acquisition Regulations including color 
of money constraints; DOD Instructions, e.g. 5000/8510/6212, mandated 
standards.)  
• Defense and Intelligence Community security policies. 
• Budget/Schedule  
• The relative utility of Information Technology decays exponentially per Moore’s 
Law 
• Adversary has access to up-to-date COTS technology 
 
Intended policy outcomes may or may not align with desired project outcomes, but policy 
compliance in-and-of-itself is not a reward.   Expending project funding according to a 
budget schedule is required, but is not a reward.   Adopting a new technology because it 
is new is not a reward. Complying with a standard because it is mandated is not a reward.   
 
Nevertheless, government EIS acquisition process typically make demonstration of 
compliance with this or that policy, burn rate, or new technical standard the objective of 
acquisition oversight activities. (Department of Defense (DoD), 2008)  By contrast, 
successful industrial EIS projects make the focus “how can we minimize the effort and 
cost of regulatory compliance (e.g. by automating Sarbanes/Oxley reporting); apply 
 13 
better security tools to reduce losses due to cyber attack; and optimize RoI by harvesting 
the efficiencies enabled by new technologies?” VAF applies industrial best practices for 
reward-focused, compliance-is-a-boundary-condition, risk-reward optimization to 
government acquisition artifacts.  
 
EIS RISK-REWARD MANAGEMENT 
 
As previously stated, the key to success is effectively managing the risks that might 
prevent achieving objectives with respect to cost, schedule, and performance. According 
to the Defense Acquisition Risk Management Guide (Department of Defense, 2006): 
 
 Risks have three components:  
 
• A future root cause (yet to happen), which, if eliminated or corrected, would 
prevent a potential consequence from occurring,  
 
• A probability (or likelihood) assessed at the present time of that future root 
cause occurring, and  
 
• The consequence (or effect) of that future occurrence.  
 
A future root cause is the most basic reason for the presence of risk. 
 
Traditionally, Program and Project Managers artfully identify future root causes of risks 
that are both: a) likely to occur, and b) have severely bad consequences if they do occur. 
The PM’s task is to take actions that reduce both the likelihood of occurrence, and 
severity of the consequences.  According to the Project Management Institute Body of 
Knowledge, PM’s should also maximum the likelihood of good outcomes.  However, 
guidance on how to do that is scarce. Regardless, standard risk management process 
includes both “qualitative” and “quantitative” measures.   Traditional best practices in 
both cases rely heavily on the opinion of expert practitioners with a strong history of 
success. (Project Management Institute, 2013)  Given the high failure rate, and associated 
dearth of expert practitioners, that approach is problematic for managing EIS projects.   
Quantitative approaches also typically include use of statistical models of traditional risk 
management factors that are based on a large population of success cases.  Again given 
the lack of a large population of success cases, for EIS the traditional risk management 
factors are apparently not relevant.    
 
For example, consider traditionally defined requirements for Reliability, Availability and 
Maintainability (RAM) (Department of Defense, 2009 ). If the reliability threshold 
requirement for a system component is a demanding Mean Time Between Failure 
(MTBF) of “X” hours, the risk might be that a critical technology solution will not be 
sufficiently reliable. Risk probability mitigation might include trading more cost-per-
capability (or size-per-capability or power-required-per-capability, etc.) in favor of 
technology solutions with greater demonstrated reliability.  Consequence mitigation 
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might include providing ready spares for the critical component so that if a component 
does fail, Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) will be reduced.   
 
Similarly, traditional readiness metrics provide insight into the probability that the system 
of interest, where “system” typically includes a man/machine mix, will successfully 
perform its mission. E.g., a military unit that is evaluated as highly “ready” will most 
likely succeed in the field.  Training, testing, and adapting tactics, techniques, and 
procedures to evolving missions are typical risk mitigation steps.  
 
In either case “availability” is a useful concept for expressing the probability of success.  
Availability, in general, takes the form of (useful units of resource) ÷ (total units of the 
same resource).  A system’s operational availability, i.e. (demonstrated up time) ÷ (total 
time), is essentially equivalent to the probability that it will work when you need it.  A 
unit’s operational availability, i.e. (human and technological assets that are fully prepared 
to perform the mission) ÷ (all human and technological assets in the unit), is highly 
correlated to the probability that the unit will successfully perform its mission.  
 
VAF uses the concept of Av = (availability of valued outcome) = (usefully applied 
resources) ÷ (total resources) to approximate the probability of achieving the valued 




P[V] = Probability of achieving valued outcome 
V = Valued, measurable, outcome associated with EIS project requirements 
Av = Availability of V 
RT = Total resources expended 
RW = Resources expended that are considered wasted w/rt to achieving V 
 
Traditional tools for managing risk in engineering projects include Work Breakdown 
Structure (WBS) for dividing work into manageable independent pieces and assigning 
appropriate resources; Integrated Master Schedule (IMS) for tracking work dependencies 
and accomplishments; Earned Value Management (EVM) for tracking allocation of 
resources (dollars and work hours) against plans; and Test Plan (TP) for assessing 
whether delivered work products actually make progress against performance goals.  In 
keeping with the financial portfolio metaphor for risk management, VAF risk 
management tools depart from the traditional suite as follows: 
 
• VAF work breakdown considers work hours as units of investment as in a 
financial portfolio.  Accordingly VAF WBS allocates resources to tasks 
associated with “investing” in independent, open standard, capability modules, 
including market research and trades analysis. VAF work breakdown also 
allocates resources to portfolio “bundling” activities.  Bundling activities would 
typically include connecting the independently developed modules in the EIS 
portfolio together, and validating and verifying their individual and combined 
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performance in context with potential RoI. Accordingly, VAF WBS will allocate 
resources to creating and maintaining a continuous customer feedback loop.  
• VAF scheduling follows an Agile model (Northern, Mayfield, Benito, & Casagni, 
2010) wherein relatively short developmental increments support parallel activity 
across the work units described above.  Therefore VAF scheduling requires 
careful treatment of resources necessary to support multiple activities.  
• VAF earned value includes the requirement that each accrued unit of budget and 
schedule must include objective, value-based, validation and/or verification exit 
criteria based on the project critical path toward RoI. In particular, dependencies 
across project work units must be thus identified, and required interoperability 
and/or cross-functionality validated and verified.   
• VAF test plans validate and verify incremental accrual of objectively defined 
value throughout the EIS lifecycle.  Accordingly, VAF test plans are tightly 
coupled to work break down, scheduling, and earned value as described above. 
VAF testing either measures or models the mathematical correlation between EIS 
system-level and process-level leading metrics, with the corresponding 
operational-level lagging measures of RoI.   
 
Traditionally risk management strategy assumes that the project contract deliverables 
represent value, and that this value is constant (DoD , 2006).  Consequently, having made 
a plan to deliver a static assumed value, the PM traditionally addresses risk and risk 
mitigation without further consideration of the relevance of risk to the anticipated reward 
 
In contrast to the traditional approach, VAF assumes that Value (V) is a volatile variable 
as it is in a financial portfolio. Indeed, Value depends on the Utility returned per-
delivered-capability, and monetary Cost-expended-per-delivered capability (c).  Utility is 
a measure of the degree to which the fielded IT satisfies rapidly evolving requirements.  
The variable c is highly dependent on the calendar time (t) it takes to deliver value.  
Therefore, V, t, c, and u are all variables that are dependent on each other. E.g.  
 
• The state of the art of IT evolves rapidly over time, according more or less to 
Moore’s Law 
• Requirements for EIS utility evolve according to, and at nearly the same pace as, 
the evolving IT  
• The value of EIS capability depends on its ability to satisfy requirements, i.e. 
provide utility, at acceptable cost, and in time to make a difference.  
• The value of any particular IT solution decreases rapidly with time 
• Cost variability is highly correlated to the man-hours it takes to invent or 
discover, and assemble EIS components, as well as the time the components in 
question have been on the market.  
 
Accordingly, VAF suggests carefully tracking the co-evolution of risk and reward, and 
their mutual dependency, throughout the life of the project.  The approach should be 
analogous to the way financial managers manage risk and reward potential in investment 
portfolios.  Specifically, VAF: 
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• Parametrically models targeted value, i.e. “reward”, as in terms of variables that 
are highly dependent on Time and Cost and evolving requirements for Utility 
• Parametrically models critical risks in terms of variables that are highly dependent 
on Time and Cost and evolving requirements for Utility 
• Models risk/reward “value factors” associated with EIS project people, processes, 
and technology in terms of both likelihood and consequence of occurrence 
• Mathematically optimizes risk and reward as co-dependent variables  
 
MODELING EIS “REWARD”, I.E. VALUE RETURNED 
 
Generally, then, VAF equates RoI to operational utility delivered, per lifecycle monetary 
cost of the utility, per time increment required to turn a monetary investment into utility. 
In the sense of risk vs. reward, “reward” is equivalent to the ROI earned via developing 
an increment of EIS capability.  
    
 
 
RoI = Return on Investment 
V(u,c,t) = Value of an EIS, or component(s) thereof, as a function of u, c, and t 
u(t) = Utility of an EIS, or component(s) thereof, as a function of time  
c(t) = Monetary lifecycle cost of an EIS, or component(s) thereof, as a function of 
time 
td = Time it takes to design, develop, test, certify, and deploy an increment of 
capability to an EIS 
 
Because utility is equivalent to the degree to which a capability satisfies requirements, we 
can measure and model u in terms of the same measures that are used to measure 
requirements satisfaction. VAF defines measures of effectiveness (ME) as lagging 
indicators, i.e. objective parameters that describe operational effectiveness. For 
government EIS, ME typically defines RoI.   
 
VAF defines measures of performance (MP), as leading indicators, i.e. objective 
parameters that describe important attributes of system or process efficiency that are only 
important if they lead demonstrably to greater RoI.  
 
Typical ME for EIS include: 
 
• Probabilities of achieving desired outcomes (e.g. probability of detection) 
• Time required for completing tasks (e.g. planning cycle time) 
• Numbers of good or bad things that happen (e.g. number of training days 
complete) 
• Proficiency scores (e.g. training evolution grade) 
 
Typical MP for EIS include: 
 
• Latencies (e.g. message latency) 
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• Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (RAM) (e.g. operational availability) 
• Standard compliance (e.g. software version, security protection level, etc.) 
• Capacity (e.g. data storage) 
• Precision (e.g. camera resolution) 
• Size weight and power  
 
Note that the distinction between ME an MP can in some cases depend on where the 
systems boundaries are drawn.  The ME for an upstream EIS might be an MP for a 
downstream EIS.  For example Probability of Detection might be an ME for an upstream 
surveillance subsystem, but an MP for a downstream targeting subsystem, the ME of 
which is Probability of Interdiction.  
 
VAF suggests identifying risk-reward optimization factors, (RX), i.e. an ability to achieve 
critical system-level, or process-level, performance characteristics X. Each RX (pun 
intended!) should have at least one corresponding MP and/or ME.  Ability depends on 
taking positive actions aligned with desired ability.  Examples of typical RX follow:  
 
RO = Ability to continuously capture evolving the operational customers’ 
perception of value within rapidly evolving operational domains (e.g. by 
designating specific operational “beta users” and establishing continuous 
feedback loop. An MP might be “customer contact hours.”)  
 
RT = Ability to continuously harvest technological value in rapidly 
evolving technological domains (e.g. by applying best commercial 
practices for open standard product line architecture, and conducting test 
and certification in parallel to development.  An MP might be “time 
required to configure component in the EIS stack.”)  
 
R$ = Ability to predict lifecycle costs for continuously evolving capability 
(e.g. by heavily leveraging existing off-the-shelf technologies that come 
with well established life cycle tech refresh cost models. MP might be 
“lifecycle costs are known and are less than ‘X’.”)  
 
RIA = Ability to balance the need-to-protect information and EIS network 
resources with the need-to-share them across security domains (e.g. by 
working with customers to define need-to-share and need-to-protect 
policies and implementing them with high assurance virtual technology.  
An MP/E might be “run time demonstration of dynamic-policy-based PL4-
equivalent need-to-share decision execution.”)  
 
RVI = Ability to find and deliver valued information bits within tightly 
constrained decision windows, given large and growing backdrop of 
available information bits (e.g. by working with customers to identify 
critical conditions of interest and associated threshold values and 
implementing automated “smart push” alerts. MP/E might be “run time 
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demonstration of decision cycle time compression against use case of 
interest.”) 
 
RPS = Availability of professional skills required for rapid evolutionary 
development (e.g. by performing careful due diligence of vendors prior 
performance against similar open standard EIS projects. MP might be 
“documented success in prior performance on similar open system 
project.”)  
 
Retc  = Various others 
 
 
Efficient systems and processes should, by definition, facilitate effective outcomes. In 
other words, as new technology is deployed to an EIS, the system and process 
efficiencies (MP) should improve, and the operational effectiveness (ME) should also 
improve predictably as a result.  Hence tested values of ME should be highly 
mathematically correlated to tested values of MP.  I.e., a VAF threshold requirement is 
that the correlation coefficient (ρpu) of the leading performance indicator, and lagging 
utility indicator, must be greater than zero. A VAF objective requirement might be a 
correlation coefficient for leading and lagging indicators approaching 1.0.  
 
Accordingly, VAF modeling or testing methods validate and verify the hypothesis that “if 
the EIS MP collectively improve, then the EIS ME will also improve.”  “Validation” 
means confirmation that the ME actually effectively describes outcomes valued by the 
customer.  “Verification” means confirmation that the selected performance 
requirements, expressed as MP, are satisfied, and that satisfaction of the performance 







RT = VAF threshold requirement for EIS RoI 
RO = VAF objective requirement for EIS RoI 
ρpo = Correlation coefficient of EIS system-level and process-level performance 
and EIS operational-level performance 
σpo = Covariance of EIS system-level and process-level performance and EIS 
functional test results (normalized across family of tests) 
σp = Standard deviation of EIS performance tests (normalized) 
σo = Standard deviation of EIS operational tests (normalized) 
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MOORE’S LAW AS AN EIS VALUE BASELINE 
 
Microprocessors are the fundamental unit of processing power.   The system performance 
of a given IT artifact, e.g. image resolution, data processing rates, algorithm execution 
time, etc., depends on availability of processing power.  The system utility, i.e. the 
customers’ experience, depends on how those system performance characteristics are 
composed to enable more-entertainment-content-per-dollar-spent, cheaper-travel-deals-
to-better-places-executed-faster, more-network bars-in-more-places, etc.  For systems 
that win in the COTS marketplace, as processing power increases exponentially, so does 
system performance; and so does system effectiveness.  Ergo, so does utility.  
 
Similarly, EIS lifecycle acquisition and engineering activities should provision for the 
system performance improvement, i.e. MP, which is predicted by Moore’s Law. In other 
words, MP should be highly correlated to the exponential growth in processing power 
predicted by Moore’s Law. As previously explained, EIS ME should likewise be tightly 
correlated to MP.  Therefore, the potential utility of a given EIS can be represented by an 
exponential curve that is proportional to, and has constant time phase relation to, Moore’s 




P(t) = The computational power predicted by Moore’s Law 
P0 = Initial value of P 
k = Growth rate constant.  If P is predicted to double every two years, then k = 




up (t) = Potential EIS utility as a function of time 
u0  = Initial value of utility expressed as ME or MP 
 
 
Moore’s law predicts exponential growth of computational power over time.  
Historically, many similar formulations have predicted exponential technological 
progress over time (Nagy B, 2013).  Rather than performance per se, these formulations 
generally predict the equivalent decreased cost-per-capability over time enabled through 
continuously improving manufacturing processes.  I.e., as production efficiency 
increases, production costs decrease, and cost-per-capability decreases.  It follows that an 
exponential increase in produced computational power corresponds to exponential 
decrease in cost-per-unit-of-computational-power.   This exponential cost-per-capability 
decrease is observable in the COTS consumer marketplace.  For example, a large format 
flat screen TV costs a fraction of what it did a few years ago.  (Kurzweil, 2006) 
 
As the cost-per-capability decreases, the capability-per-cost increases. Therefore, a 
constant outlay for IT across any given time period should return exponentially 
improving capability over that period.  The VAF value model includes this tight coupling 
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between u and c by treating the utility to cost ratio, u/c, as a single exponentially 
increasing function, or the cost-to-utility ratio (c/u) as an exponentially decreasing 
function, with respect to time. That is, as raw computing power increases exponentially, 
delivered information value should likewise increase exponentially. At the same time, 
cost-per-unit-of-capability should decrease exponentially.  (See figure 1.) 
 
Moore’s Law and the other models of exponential manufacturing process improvement 
are not only based on physics.  They are self-sustained by the competitive forces around 
satisfying customer expectations. Customers demand that the exponential improvement 
on which they depend will continue. (Schaller, 1997)  
 
Fred Brooks, in his famous “No Silver Bullet” essay (Brooks, 1986) explained why 
software productivity, unlike IT hardware productivity does not follow Moore’s law.  
Essentially, he explains that very complex nature of software, contrasted with the 
simplicity of the digital transistor, precludes exponential improvement. Nevertheless, 
VAF suggests that EIS PMs can harness that self-sustaining competitive force just as well 
as savvy business managers in other sectors have done by hedging against, rather than 
controlling, risks associated with software complexity. They can do that hedging by 
applying various risk-reward optimization practices.  Arguably, Brooks suggested the 
same thing when he discussed the various promising software paradigms that 
cumulatively might help the software engineering discipline improve going forward.  
However to achieve assured exponential improvement, EIS PMs must make harvesting 
potentially exponential RoI their prime directive.  This is exactly what chip 
manufacturers do to stay on the Moore’s Law power curve; and what auto manufactures 


















u(t) = Utility of an EIS, or component(s) thereof, as a function of time  
c(t) = Monetary cost of an EIS, or component(s) thereof, as a function of time  
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RT = EIS threshold requirement 
RO = EIS objective requirement 
 = Correlation coefficient of validated and verified , and Moore’s Law 
(RoI)p = Potential Return on Investment in EIS, i.e. potential reward 
Vp (u,c,t) = Potential value of an EIS, or component(s) thereof, as a function of u, 
c, and t 
td = Time it takes to design, develop, test, certify, and deploy an increment of 
capability to an EIS 
k = Growth rate constant.  If computational power (P) is predicted to double every 
two years, then k = ln2/2, if P is predicted to double every 1.5 years, then k = 




Figure 1: VAF forces utility-per-cost to improve in step with Moore's Law by tightl coupling 
software and hardware performance metrics with customer-centric utility metrics. 
 
 
MODELING REWARD PROBABILITY 
 
The fundamental “objective” requirement for any EIS engineering and acquisition project 
is to achieve the maximum possible RoI, i.e. Vp, by efficiently harvesting exponentially 
improving products and services from the IT marketplace. PMs should design threshold 
 22 
requirements for particular EIS projects according to acceptable departures from the 
carefully determined potential RoI.  
 
Establishing appropriate threshold and objective requirements for u/c demands carefully 
scaling and base lining the current value of u/c in enterprise terms that are appropriate for 
predicable, exponential improvement over the period of interest.  For example, in a 





u = utility  
(PD)L = Probability of Detecting the target of interest within a local area under 
surveillance by an information system of interest.   
(T+ - T-)L  = Difference between number of correct target identifications (T+) and 
incorrect target identifications (T-) within a local period/area of interest, L 
 (TT)L = Total number of targets of interest that traversed the local period/area of 
interest, L 
 
In this case, the baseline evaluation of u will likely be relatively high. That is the local 
surveillance system might correctly detect most of the targets that traverse its very 
limited field of view.  In this case, (PD)L will not lend itself to predicable exponential 
growth.  On the other hand, the international law and enforcement counter trafficking 




u = utility  
(PD)E = Probability of Detecting the target of interest anywhere within the 
enterprise area/time of interest via information system of systems   
(T+ - T-)E  = Difference between number of correct target identifications (T+) and 
incorrect target identifications (T-) anywhere within the enterprise area/time of 
interest, E. 
 (TT)L = Total number of targets of interest that traversed the enterprise 
period/area of interest, E 
 
 
In this case, the baseline value of u/c is very small. After all, the enterprise area of 
interest is the entire world and the number of successfully detected illicit transactions 
miniscule.   However, as the efficiency and effectiveness of the information system of 
systems improves - i.e. more, better, cheaper, more interoperable sensors and processors 
are deployed in more places by more partners - then improvement in u/c can be 
reasonably expected to achieve exponential growth.   
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VAF CALCULATION OF PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS 
 
Traditional program management doctrine categorizes and manages risks in terms of 
impact to cost, schedule, and performance.  Traditionally, risks are identified in terms of 
their probability to occur, and the potential bad consequence of their occurrence.  
Likewise, VAF categorizes reward in terms of potential good consequences, and the 
probability of their occurrence. In general, the probability of achieving the threshold 
requirement for RoI is equal to the product of the probabilities of achieving threshold 






Figure 2: Optimizing RoI depends on modeling and/or measuring co-dependence and evolution of 
risk and reward. 
P[Vt] = Probability of achieving threshold level of valued outcome, i.e. 
RoI. 
P[ct] = Probability of satisfying threshold level of monetary budget 
requirements.  
P[ut] = Probability of achieving threshold level of utility requirements.  




VAF defines “cost” as monetary lifecycle costs for developing, testing, evaluating, 
certifying, deploying, maintaining, and upgrading an EIS or component(s) thereof. 
According to VAF, the probability of achieving threshold targets for cost depend on 
optimizing the combination of, for example: up front costs including initial purchase and 
any required infrastructure investments; projected upgrade and maintenance costs; and 






P[ct] = Probability of achieving threshold requirement for cost 
=  Availability of cost efficiency  
Ce = Previously estimated total EIS lifecycle costs including upfront costs for 
infrastructure and initial purchases, engineering costs, and lifecycle upgrade and 
maintenance costs.   
ce = Root mean square error of actual lifecycle costs vs. estimated costs  
ca = Actual costs for the )indicated activity 
ce = Previously estimated costs for the )indicated activity  
 
In the VAF lexicon, “effectiveness” and/or “performance” are equivalent to utility.  VAF 
suggests that the probability of achieving the targeted level of 
utility/performance/effectiveness depends on the quality of requirements, scope of the 
potential solution space, efficiency of the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), efficiency of 
the capability integration platform, and the quality of Test and Evaluation (T&E.)  
 
Achieving sufficient quality of requirements demands a process that provides objective 
feedback from the operational customer community several times during any particular 
developmental cycle. Achieving sufficient scope of solution set demands a process that 
socializes the EIS project use cases broadly across the landscape of innovative industry.  
Achieving efficiency of AoA requires an automated process, objective measures, and 
incentives to allow and encourage solution providers to self-demonstrate the Vp of their 
offerings.  Achieving efficiency in the integration platform requires well-defined 
architectural functions and open standard interfaces.  Achieving quality of T&E requires 
test-based designs, persistent test frameworks, and iterative testing throughout project 
execution.   
 
To maximize the probability of satisfying EIS threshold performance/effectiveness 
requirements, the project work breakdown should scrupulously allocate the proper 
relative proportions of billable time spent: processing operational customers feedback; 
evaluating evolving capabilities in the market; carefully rationing any time spent 
developing immature technologies; and testing; etc.  The project manager should adjust 
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this schedule optimization model at each successive developmental cycle.  Assuming that 
process is ongoing, PMs can model the probability of satisfying threshold levels of 
effectiveness/performance/utility by tracking both whether the critical activities occurred 
as scheduled, and how well the test scores aligned with targeted measures.  If the right 
risk/reward optimization activities are scheduled and performed, test results should both 






P[ut] = Probability of achieving threshold requirement for 
effectiveness/performance/utility 
=  Availability of critical scheduled activities  
td = Originally scheduled time for designing, engineering, T&E, and certification 
of an incremental EIS capability delivery. 
ca = Root mean square error of actual time spent on critical risk-reward 
optimization activities compared to originally scheduled time for those activities.  
ta = Time actually spent performing the )indicated activity 
ts = Time originally scheduled for the )indicated activity  
 
 
According to VAF, the threshold value of “schedule” assures that capability is designed, 
developed, tested, certified, delivered and/or upgraded within the “technology half-life” 
of the technology in question.  The concept of technology half-life recognizes the value 
of any unit of IT is highly perishable.  Technology half-life is the length of time it takes 
for the value of the IT unit of interest to decrease to notionally half of its original value.  
In practice, determining technology half-life is usually subjective.  The goal is to deploy 
the technology standard of interest no later than midway through its optimally useful 
lifetime.  
 
Achieving assurance of “schedule value” requires a schedule process that standardizes 
and parallelizes sub process, e.g. testing part A while with developing part B; de-conflicts 
resources, e.g. schedules enterprise testing resources across independent sub tasks; 
schedules work to include preparing independently useful capability modules that can be 
developed and or procured and deployed irrespective of schedule delays associated with 
other modules.   
 
    
 
P[st] = Probability of achieving threshold schedule requirements 
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Adv  = Availability of developed value.  I.e. weighted sum of completed work 
units divided by weighted sum of scheduled work units.  
Wfn = Successfully completed work unit.  Scope of any designated work unit 
must include objective V&V of that unit as part of its completion criteria.  Thus 
a completed work unit is equivalent to accruing actual measured, or robustly 
modeled, value.   
Wfn = Scheduled work unit.  
Kn = Weighting factor.  Weighting should take into account a clear delineation of 
how any work unit relates to project critical path.   
n = Counting index 
f = Number of successfully completed and tested scheduled work units. 
p = Number of scheduled work units.  
 
In traditional program management risk mitigation strategies, risks are often posed in the 
form of a conditional statement that includes a hypothesis and a conclusion.  Note that in 
the VAF construct, risk and reward conditional statements are often deliberately 
contrapositives of each other or nearly so, e.g.:  
 
If: Positive action is taken; Then: positive RoI is likely to occur   
If: Positive action is not taken; Then: positive RoI is not likely to occur  
 
In these cases the same actions serve to maximize the probability and positive impact of 
reward, and minimize the probability and negative impact of risk. For example, 
establishing a feedback loop with operational customers maximizes the probability that 
the EIS capability will provide the targeted value.  It also minimizes the risk that the EIS 
requirements will evolve faster than the EIS capability can be delivered.  (See figure 2.) 
 
However, in some cases risks are orthogonal to rewards.  The risk that bad weather will 
impact the cost, schedule, and performance associated with for operational testing is 
orthogonal to how well the operational test incorporates feedback from the customer.  In 
these cases, VAF simply adds the orthogonal risks and risk mitigation strategies to the 
overall risk-reward rubric.  
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